Do incumbents in non-democratic countries commit electoral fraud strategically or do they stuff the box whenever they see a chance? In this paper, I study the heterogeneous effects of election monitoring in order to examine whether certain characteristics of polling stations make them more susceptible to be used for fraud. In particular, I examine the effects of average income and distance on electoral fraud. To measure the amount of fraud that benefited the pro-Putin party, United Russia, I use the experimental data of random observer assignment during the Russian parliamentary elections in 2011 collected by Enikolopov et al. (2013) . I supplement their data with a unique dataset of Moscow residents' personal information to estimate the effect of average income and distance to center on electoral fraud. I find no difference between poorer and more affluent precincts, or between precincts that are closer and farther from the city center, with respect to the incumbent party vote share and turnout. However, I find that one of the opposition parties, Apple, lost as many as 30% of all votes cast for it, and that the amount of fraud was more significant in the center than in the outskirts.
Introduction
Electoral fraud is common in authoritarian states that hold elections (Hyde, 2011) . The fact that they hold elections suggests that such regimes care about their legitimacy in the eyes of electorate and international community. At the same time, they commit fraud in order to demonstrate higher support than they really have and, consequently, to stay in power, discourage opposition, and convince the population to continue supporting them. Fraud can deteriorate their legitimacy, creating an incentive to commit it in the least visible way possible.
Are such regimes strategic in how they target fraud?
In this paper, I study whether more fraud takes place in poorer and more remote precincts. Modernization theory suggests that wealthier voters tend to be more committed to democratic norms. They will be more resentful of fraud and more likely to protest if they detect it. They may also be more likely to spot it than unsophisticated voters. This suggests that incumbents should avoid districts with higher residents' income. Districts located further from the city center are less likely to be visited by journalists, election monitors, opposition activists and the generally interested public. Therefore, they could be more attractive for election officials seeking to stuff the ballot box.
How can one measure geographical variation in fraud, given that we cannot measure such fraud directly? One way is to estimate the effectiveness of anti-fraud measures. Research has established that the presence of electoral observers at a polling station reduces fraud in that station (Hyde, 2007 , Enikolopov et al., 2013 , Asunka et al., 2017 . In this paper, I test whether the presence of such monitors reduces it more in some types of districts than in others.
That would imply that the initial level of fraud was higher in the districts where the effect of the monitors was greatest.
To measure the amount of fraud which benefited the pro-Putin party United Russia, I
use the random assignment of observers conducted by Enikolopov et al. (2013) employer's name. I geolocate Moscow polling stations and personal home addresses available in the database (more than 3,000,000 records) through Yandex Maps. 1 Then, I assign each individual to the closest polling station. As a result, I delineate small geographical units that lie approximately within the borders of precincts. For each precinct I estimate the average income and distance from the city center. There is significant variation in precincts' characteristics. For example, the farthest polling station is located 27 km away from the Kremlin; the closest poll is just 700 m away. The wealthiest precincts are ten times as rich as the poorest ones. The vote share of United Russia ranges from 13% to 94%.
I use three different methods to detect heterogeneity in the treatment effect. First, I interact a dummy variable for the presence of election monitors with the average logged income and distance from the city center. Second, I divide the sample into two parts along two dimensions -relative affluence and proximity to center. I create dummy variables for precincts poorer than the median income and farther than the median distance as well as their interactions with the observer dummy. Third, I match the treated stations with up to four nearest neighbors in the control group. I compare a party's vote share in the control and treatment group and include neighborhood income and distance from the center as controls. If these neighborhood characteristics play a role in determining fraud location, they must be statistically significant in these regressions.
The overall effect of observers is very strong. At the monitored polling stations, United Russia received on average 10.9 fewer percentage points than at polling stations in the control group if estimated through the bivariate regression and 13.9 fewer percentage points if estimated through propensity score matching. The turnout at polling stations with observers was 6.5 percentage points lower, which can be an indication of ballot box stuffing. One of the 1 The analogue of Google in Russia opposition parties, Apple, was particularly disadvantaged as a result of fraud in this election.
Around 30% of votes cast for it, twice as many votes as for any other opposition party, were stolen. 2 There are two potential explanations for Apple being the target of fraud. First, on the ideological line, it is located farther from the incumbent party than any other competitor. If it becomes a parliamentary party, it might be a difficult partner. The fewer seats it gets, the lower its bargaining power. Second, election officials might believe that Apple was not going to pass the 7% threshold necessary to create a faction in the parliament, and thus would not protest against fraud in Moscow. Indeed, on a national level Apple did not pass the threshold.
I find heterogeneous effects of observers on Apple vote share with respect to the distance from the center. Fraud was actually concentrated in the center. For each additional kilometer closer to the center, observers were able to prevent stealing of 0.2 percentage points of votes cast for this party. It means that in a polling station located 10 km away from the city center, fraud against Apple was lower by approximately 2%. This result is robust to all specifications. This party might have been particularly affected by fraud in the center because election officials might perceive that more voters, in general, cast ballots for Apple there. Ballot theft from a party with a larger vote share could be less visible.
However, I find no heterogeneity effect with respect to the vote share of United Russia.
There are three potential reasons for this. First, the incumbent did not target fraud based on the variables I studied. It was the first instance of a relatively massive use of domestic observers. Their assignment to polling stations was kept secret until the last moment not only to government officials but also to observers themselves. Stuffing the box strategically in certain places requires some kind of in-advance agreement among officials responsible for the election. In this case, they did not have the opportunity to decide on it beforehand. Second, the number of treated units might not have been large enough to capture the heterogeneity in the treatment effect, especially if this effect is not large. There were 143 polling stations with observers in my sample. Third, the experiment was conducted in Moscow, a densely populated city with one of the largest budgets in the world. Moscow does not have neighborhoods that are poor and hidden enough to be interesting to government officials responsible for fraud.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the analytical framework. In Section 3 I describe the data. In Section 4 I present the empirical strategy. In Section 5 I demonstrate the results. Section 6 concludes.
Analytical framework
In the experiment conducted by Enikolopov et al. (2013) , observers were present at 5% of Moscow polling stations. The main identifying assumption that scholars use when they exploit the random assignment of observers is that without monitoring, the results at the polling stations assigned to the treatment group would have been the same as in the control group. Their analysis reveals that observers did not have the same experience with regard to fraud at every polling station. Specifically, among the 156 polls in the treatment group, in 38 polling stations, observers were not able to get the official protocol of the vote count; in 43 polling stations, observers reported serious violations; and in 75 polling stations, observers reported no serious violations. The effect of monitoring was very different at these stations.
The vote share of the incumbent party United Russia was lower by 4.4 percentage points at stations where observers were not able to receive the protocol than at stations in the control group, by 7.3 percentage points at stations where they reported serious violations and by 15.9 percentage points at stations where no violations were reported. If such heterogeneity is observed in the treatment group, it is reasonable to infer that the amount of fraud committed at each particular polling station in the control group was not uniform. It is possible that heterogeneity in the effect of observers is caused by the differences in observers' skills.
However, when they are randomly assigned, one should not observe systematic patterns of fraud with respect to certain polling stations.
What strategies could the incumbent pursue in order to maximize the vote share and make fraud less visible (assuming it is actually his goal)?
Hypothesis 1: There is more fraud in poorer neighborhoods.
In wealthier neighborhoods voters are in general more sophisticated. Income is positively correlated with education and political awareness. Therefore, they are more likely to detect fraud. In addition, they understand the value of clean elections and can protest if they notice irregularities. This argument is associated with a more general theory about the relationship between democracy and development. At a certain level of income, countries are more likely to democratize (Boix and Stokes, 2003) . Also, after democratization wealthier countries are more likely to sustain democratic institutions (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) .
Students of modernization are uncertain about the underlying causes of this relationship, which lie beyond the scope of this study. I apply this argument in a very particular context. Election officials may avoid committing fraud in places where they serve wealthier voters. In such places, election monitoring cannot make much difference because the equilibrium amount of fraud is lower on average than the equilibrium level in poorer neighborhoods.
Hypothesis 2:
There is more fraud in more remote neighborhoods.
Polling stations located further from the city center may be safer places for election manipulation. Opposition activists, journalists, any generally interested members of the public are less likely to reach polling stations located far away from the city center. Despite the intuitiveness of this argument, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study that specifically examines the relationship between the accessibility of the polling station and the amount of fraud. According to my hypothesis, the effect of observers must be larger at polling stations located far away from the city center.
Poverty and remoteness are synonyms in many settings (Bird et al., 2011, Calvo and Murillo, 2004, Diaz-Cayeros et al., forthcoming) . However, they are not necessarily the same thing, especially, in the context of big cities. For example, in Moscow the most expensive real estate is indeed concentrated in the city center. But only 6% of the population live in the central administrative district. There are expensive neighborhoods close to the city borders in the west and south west and poor neighborhoods close to the center in the east.
I test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 by measuring the effect of observers and then comparing the magnitude of the effect at polling stations with different levels of average income and proximity to the city center. The assumption is that the difference in the vote shares for the incumbent party, the opposition parties, and the turnout at the treated and control stations is actually the amount of fraud.
Data

Personal information data
To estimate the average income in each precinct, I use the data on personal income of (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2006) , to measure the hidden earnings (Braguinsky et al., 2014) , and to examine the interaction between CEO's personal propensity to corruption and firm performance (Mironov, 2015 Moscow is a large city of 10-12 million of inhabitants who differ in their level of education, income, voting preferences, etc. To ensure heterogeneity in the treatment group, every 25th polling station in each electoral district was assigned for observation, starting from the 1st one.
Finally, in 71 electoral districts with fewer than 26 polling stations, they selected only the 1st one. In 6 districts with more than 51 polling stations they selected the 1st, 26th, and 51th polling stations. In the remaining 48 districts they selected the 1st and 26th stations. that there is a systematic error in data entry for certain categories of employees.
Variables
To test the Hypothesis 1 and the Hypothesis 2 I create the following variables: Logged income is the average of the logs of individual incomes in a neighborhood. I use the log scale because a simple mean of incomes is very sensitive to outliers. Logged income is the measure of relative precincts' wealth that allows me to test the Hypothesis 1.
Distance to center is the distance from the center of the Kremlin to a polling station.
Moscow has a medieval ring-like structure. Its business, social, and cultural life is concentrated in the city center. Distance to center is the measure of remoteness relevant to the Hypothesis 2.
In addition, I create several auxiliary variables that I use as controls:
Age is the average age of individuals in a neighborhood that I calculate from the personal information dataset of Muscovites. The notion -young=liberal and old=conservative‖ is a long-standing empirical formula (see Fisher (2008) for literature review and recent trends).
Different age cohorts have different political party preferences. Standard deviation of the logged income is the standard deviation of the logged incomes in a neighborhood. This is my measure of inequality. There is an ongoing debate among economists about the role of inequality for policy preferences, and hence, the support for political parties which promise certain levels of taxation and redistribution (Meltzer-Richards, 1981 , Acemoglu et al., 2005 , Ansell and Samuels, 2014 . I also control for Standard deviation of the logged income because recent research establishes a relationship between inequality and electoral fraud. Ziblatt (2009) demonstrates that socioeconomic inequality is associated with higher probability of fraud.
Share of public employees
Distance to subway is the distance between a polling station and the closest subway station. It is estimated as a line which means that real distance is longer. I set the maximum value for the Distance to subway at 2 km. I assume that if the distance is longer than 2 km (around a 30-minute walk) one has to use other means of transportation. Subway is the main mean of public transportation in Moscow. In 2011, 186 stations existed, and 6.5 million people used them daily. Distance to subway is an additional measure of remoteness relevant to Hypothesis 2. In addition to the OLS regressions, I perform propensity score matching. For each treated polling station, I find the most similar pair in the control group. Matching is usually used for observational studies rather than experiments. However, in this case it can provide more accurate estimates of the effect of monitoring than OLS regression because the treatment group is small and the control group is very heterogeneous. Propensity score matching is preferable to other types of matching when units are compared in many dimensions at once. I match polling stations using variables that provide the best balance. I exclude from the control group polling stations located in the same building as the treated polls: although they will be most similar, they are also exposed to spillover effects.
4.2.Treatment heterogeneity
To assess treatment heterogeneity I use treatment-by-covariate interactions (Gerber and Green, 2012 
Second, I divide the sample into two parts along two dimensions. In particular, I
distinguish between poorer and wealthier neighborhoods and between further to the center and closer to the center neighborhoods. I create interaction terms between the dummies for poorer neighborhoods and neighborhoods located further from the center and the dummy for observer: 
where i poor is a dummy for neighborhoods below the median income. All other variables are defined in equation (1). 
where _ i far away is a dummy for neighborhoods below the median distance from the center.
All other variables are defined in equation (1).
Finally, I use the most similar polling stations by propensity score and run a regression with a party vote share of the control group as the dependent variable using party vote share in the treated pair as the independent variable and controls relevant to my hypotheses. The values I use for the covariates come from polling stations in the control group. They could come from the treatment group as well with similar results, since polling stations are matched by these variables. If the average income in the neighborhood and its distance from the center play a role in fraud, coefficients for these variables would be statistically significant the following regression:
where _ ip V control is a party's vote share at a polling station from the control group in the matched pair, _ ip V treatment is a party's vote share at a polling station from the treatment group in the matched pair.
I conduct a sensitivity analysis comparing the treated station with the nearest neighbor, two, three, and four neighbors in the control group. Additional benefit of this robustness check is that I have more observations, and hence, more power of the test to detect the effect in regressions with larger number of neighbors. There 286 observations in regressions with two matched neighbors, 429 with three matched neighbors, and 572 with four matched neighbors.
Results
5.1.The effect of observers
I start my empirical analysis with the overall impact evaluation of observers present at a polling station. Table 3 presents the results of the bivariate regression of the party vote share on the dummy for Observer. I use a different sample of polling stations than that used by Enikolopov et al. (2013) because Zelenograd is excluded from my sample. Nevertheless, I get similar results. 6 United Russia's vote share was 10.9 percentage points lower at polling stations with monitoring. The turnout there was lower by 6.5 percentage points. This result suggests that ballot box stuffing was an important source of fraud. Each polling station is supplied with 6 These results differ from those reported by Enikolopov et al. (2013) . However, in their replication materials they admit a coding error. When corrected, the results become close to that presented in Table 3 . (1)- (5)) and turnout (column (6)). Observer is the dummy for observer present at a polling station. Electoral district fixed effects are included in the regression to control for heterogeneity of unobservable characteristics. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by electoral districts. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. I add covariates in order to disentangle which characteristics of the neighborhoods taken into account in fixed effects play more prominent role in defining voting outcomes. Table 4 presents the results. Interestingly, controlling for distance from center and distance from subway, income is not significant for voting for United Russia as well as other parties.
The only party for which income was significant is the Communist party, but the sign of the coefficient is the opposite from that predicted by the -left-poor‖ theory. This long-standing theory in political science associates lower income with leftist ideology (Lipset et al., 1954 There are several potential explanations for the null finding. First, in this case, the incumbent might not have had any strategy with respect to fraud. Electoral officials could have just stuffed the boxes whenever they could, regardless of relative affluence of the neighborhood. Second, the setting might be unfit to test the Hypothesis 1. Empirical research in other countries shows that parties distinguish electoral districts by their level of poverty (DiazCayeros et al., forthcoming). However, this experiment was conducted in Moscow, one of the most affluent and densely populated cities in the world. The most impoverished and remote neighborhoods may be not impoverished and remote enough to be of interest to government officials. Finally, I had only 143 polls in the treatment group. Such a small sample may not provide enough power to capture the heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Alternatively, the effect might be not large enough to be detected with the given sample size. and Age as controls. Table 7 presents the results. The interaction variable between Observer and Distance to center is statistically insignificant for the vote share of United Russia, the vote share of most opposition parties, and the turnout. However, it is statistically significant at 5% level in the regression with the Apple vote share as the dependent variable. The sign of the coefficient is the opposite to that predicted by the Hypothesis 2. An observer was able to prevent less fraud at polling stations located farther from the center. With each additional kilometer from the center the Apple vote share was lower by 0.2 percentage points at the monitored polling stations. Table 7 .The Effect of observers and distance to center
The table presents the OLS estimation of the effect of observer with the introduced interaction term between the Observer dummy and Distance to center. All other variables are defined in Table 1 . Electoral district fixed effects are included in the regression to control for heterogeneity of unobservable characteristics. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. In the propensity score matching regressions, I compare a party's vote share in the control group with the party's vote share in the treated group from the matched pair. I conduct a sensitivity analysis by matching the treated station with one, two, three, and four closest neighbors in the control group. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 10 Russia (control) is the United Russia vote share at a polling station in the control group from the matched pair. United Russia (treatment) is the United Russia vote share at a treated polling station from the matched pair. Logged income (control) is the logged income at a polling station in the control group from the matched pair. Distance to center (control) is the distance to center from a polling station in the control group from the matched pair. Column (1) shows the results of the matching of the treated polling station with one nearest neighbor in the control group, column (2) with two nearest neighbors, column (3) with three nearest neighbors, column (4) with four nearest neighbors. The number of observations depends on the number of neighbors with which the treated station is matched in the control group. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
United Russia (control) (1) shows the results of the matching of the treated polling station with one nearest neighbor in the control group, column (2) with two nearest neighbors, column (3) with three nearest neighbors, column (4) with four nearest neighbors. The number of observations depends on the number of neighbors with which the treated station is matched in the control group. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Apple (control) 
Conclusion
Electoral fraud is an institutionalized feature of many authoritarian regimes. I find that the overall effect of observers was significant. At the treated polling stations, the incumbent United Russia's vote share was 10.9 percentage points lower than at the stations in the control group. It is likely that fraud took place through ballot stuffing because turnout was 6.5 percentage points lower at polls with observers present. Estimated by the propensity score matching, the effect of observers is even higher. The average treatment effect on the treated is 13.9 percentage points less votes for the incumbent. In addition, not all parties lost equally. Fraud was most damaging for the Apple party. At the monitored polling stations, Apple's vote share was 3.5 percentage points higher than at the untreated ones; this constitutes almost one third of all votes cast for this party.
I find no difference in the effect of observers with respect to income and distance from the center. This could be because either the effect of observers was homogeneous in this election or the difference was not large enough to be detected with the given sample size.
However, I find that observers were not equally effective with respect to the Apple vote share.
They were able to prevent more fraud against this party in precincts closer to the city center.
This result is robust and remains regardless of the method used to measure the effect of observers.
